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1 Introduction
We analyze the mobile telecommunications industry in Portugal. We rst test whether cost
reduction and competition were a¤ected by the entry of an additional rms in 1998 and the
liberalization of xed telephony in 2000. Second, we focus on the pricing behavior of the rms.
With a dynamic model, we shed light on whether rms cared for immediate prots, or whether
they were more concerned with increasing their customer base during the period we study.
A common practice in the empirical industry models that focus on oligopolistic frameworks
is to assume that rms are e¢ cient and costs are exogenous. This is in contradiction with
a rich empirical tradition related to the measurement of e¢ ciency through the estimation of
production and cost functions (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
Moreover, the recent literature on incentives proposed a theoretical framework to account for
the e¤ect of cost reduction by rms, emphasizing the endogeneity of costs (La¤ont, 1994). This
literature suggests that the rmsendogenous e¤ort, depends closely on the constraints exerted
by the competitive or regulatory environment it faces.
We construct and estimate an industry model that includes cross-price elasticities, and
where rms choose both prices and cost reducing e¤ort. The model consists of a system of
equations that accounts for the demand, network, and the technology of each rm. Technology
is described by a cost function that includes two non-observable parameters: the exogenous
technical ine¢ ciency of each rm, and cost reducing e¤ort. Cost reducing e¤ort can be expressed
by taking into account the competitive pressures impinging on the activity of each rm before
and after the entry of a third rm or the liberalization of the telecommunications industry.
The Portuguese mobile telephony industry provides a suitable application for the framework
we have in mind. In Portugal, the rm associated with the incumbent, Tmn, started its
activity in 1989 with the analogue technology C-450. In 1991, the sectorial regulator, ICP-
ANACOM, assigned two licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 900. One of the licenses
was assigned to Tmn. The other license was assigned to the entrant Vodafone. In 1997, the
regulator assigned three licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 1800. Two licenses
were assigned to Tmn and Vodafone. A third license was assigned to the entrant Optimus,
which was also granted a license to operate GSM 900.1 Finally, the legislation of the EU
imposed the full liberalization of the telecommunications industry at the end of the nineties.
1Both of the licenses for GSM 900 and for GSM 1800 were assigned through public tenders, following the
EU Directives 91/287 and 96/2, respectively. The rst Directive instructed member states to adopt the GSM
standard, and the second to grant at least 2 GSM 900 licenses and to allow additional rms to use GSM 1800.
System GSM 900 operates on the 900 MHz frequency. System GSM 1800 operates on the 1800 MHz frequency.
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The liberalization a¤ected essentially xed line services. After 1998, any rm licensed by the
sectorial regulator could o¤er xed telephony services, either through direct access based on
their own infrastructures, or through indirect access, available for all types of calls. In Portugal
the liberalization took e¤ect in 2000.2 Note that the entry ofOptimus and the 2000 liberalization
were independent and exogenous events, determined largely at the EU level.
After its inception in 1989, the Portuguese mobile telephony industry had a fast di¤usion,
analyzed in Pereira and Pernias (2004), which led to high and rising penetration rates. After
entering the market in 1992, Vodafone gained revenue market share rapidly as shown in Figure
1. During the duopoly period, i.e., from 1992 to 1997, Tmn and Vodafone essentially shared
the market. The entry of Optimus led to an asymmetric split of the market, which suggests
that this event had a signicant impact in the industry.
[Figure 1]
The objective of our work is threefold. First, we test whether the entry of Optimus in
1998, or the full liberalization of the telecommunications industry in 2000, gave rms stronger
incentives to reduce costs. Note that economic theory has no simple prediction about the
relation between the number of competitors in a market, and incentives to reduce costs.3 We
construct a cost function that accounts for the rms cost reducing e¤ort, and test several
scenarios of incentive pressures against each other, in order to identify which ts the data
better. We show that cost reducing e¤ort increased signicantly after the entry of Optimus in
1998, while the 2000 liberalization had only a mild impact on cost reduction.4
Second, with a non-nested test, we show that our model improves upon a simple cost function
with no ine¢ ciency and no e¤ort. We discuss alternative explanations for cost reduction after
2The liberalization was promoted by, among others, the Council Directive 90/387/EEC, the Commission
Directive 90/388/EEC, Council Resolution 93/C213/01, and the Commission Directive 96/19/EC. The o¢ cial
date for the liberalization was 1998. Portugal, like other countries, beneted from a derogation (Commission
Decision 97/310/EC).
3The likely e¤ect of the entry is a decrease in prices. If in addition the quantity produced by each rm
increases, then rms have more incentives to invest in marginal cost reducing e¤ort. If, however, the quantity
produced by each rm decreases, rms have less incentives to invest in cost reduction. See Pereira (2001) for a
model where lower prices can be associated with higher or lower investment in cost reduction.
4Note that, on the one hand, more competition in xed telephony should have pushed the prices of this service
down, and reduced the substitution between xed and mobile telephony (Barros and Cadima (2002), Rodini et
al. (2003)). On the other hand, the liberalization involved a tari¤ rebalancing which increased the telephone
subscription fee and the price of local calls. It is therefore unclear what the impact of the full liberalization of
the telecommunications market in Portugal should have been.
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the entry of Optimus, such as preemptive behavior by the incumbents or spillovers e¤ects at
the industry level, and explain why we discard them.
Third, given these estimates, we retrieve cost and demand parameters to construct marginal
costs, and therefore price-cost margins. The results show that the standard model underesti-
mates the toughness of competition. Using an original dynamic pricing framework, we test
whether price-cost margins correspond to a non-cooperative Nash behavior under alternative
hypothesis, where rm either have a myopic or a long run perspective. We nd that estimated
price-cost margins are similar to hypothetical Nash margins, if rms are patient, and have opti-
mistic beliefs about the industry growth. As a by-product, network e¤ects and switching costs
are also identied as playing an important role in this industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cost, network, and
demand systems. Section 3 proposes a model of rmscost reduction activity. Section 4 presents
an empirical evaluation of such activity. Finally, Section 5 evaluates the competitive forces in
the industry, which entails determining the pricing rules set by rms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Building Blocks of the Model
In what follows, we specify a model of the rmsbehavior that encompasses two important
aspects of our problem. We are interested in representing the rmscost reducing activity and
pricing decisions, as well as the interconnection between these two aspects. This entails dening
rst a three part structure that includes cost, network growth, and demand equations.
2.1 Demand and Network Growth
We refer to the three rms in the market by their order of entry, e.g., Tmn is rm 1, and
index them with subscript i = 1; 2; 3. We index time through subscript t. The demand of rm
i on period t depends on its price pit and a vector of the competitorsprices pjt. Moreover,
we account for the consumersincome rt, the size of its network, i.e., numbers of subscribers,
in the previous period nit 1, and a time trend t. The inclusion of the size of the network in
the previous period could be justied by two non-mutually exclusive reasons. The rst reason
involves network economies. The consumersmarginal valuation of the service depends on the
number of other consumers who belong to the network. However, consumers only observe with
lag the size of the rmsnetworks.5 The second reason involves switching costs or consumer
5Network interconnection obligations mitigate, but do not eliminate network economies. Di¤erences between
intra and inter network calls resurface the value for a consumer of belonging to a large network as well as the
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inertia. An increase in a rms price relative to the prices of its rivals induces consumers to
leave the rm. However, if consumers have switching costs, they will not respond immediately,
but only over time. The time trend accounts for changes in preferences or consumer awareness.
Denote by yit the tra¢ c, i.e., minutes of communication, supplied by rm i in period t. Each
rm faces a demand of the form:
yit = Di(pit;pjt; rt; nit 1; t j); (1)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Two comments are in order. First, we do
not impose any pattern of substitution between the rmsproducts. In particular, we do not
impose that the products are homogeneous. Second, we assume that rms charge linear prices.
This hardly involves any loss of generality, since 80% of the subscribers have pre-paid cards.
We also assume that the size of rm is network in period t, depends on its price pit. Thus,
each rm faces a network function of the form:
nit = Nit(pit j ); (2)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The network function will be useful in
Section 5 where we disentangle short-run from long-run pricing decisions. Equations (1) and
(2) give a dynamic structure to the model in the sense that a rms demand in period t depends
on its price of the previous period.
2.2 Costs
We now turn to the cost side of the model. To produce a volume of tra¢ c yit, rm i requires
quantities of labor, lit, materials, mit, and capital, kit. Denote by !lit, !mit, and !kit, the price
of labor, materials and capital, respectively.
Denote by cit the observed operating cost of rm i. An important feature of our model
is that the actual operating cost may di¤er from the minimum operating cost. Ine¢ ciency
may prevent rms from reaching the required output level yit at the minimum cost, and this
may result in upward distorted costs.6 However, rms can undertake cost reducing activities
to counterbalance their ine¢ ciency. Firms can engage in process research and development,
strategic advantage for a rm of owning a large network.
6There are several ways of thinking about ine¢ ciency. First, it may simply be the result of the irreducible
uncertainty that involves the creation of a new production process. This interpretation is in line with Lippman
and Rumelt, (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic (1982), and Klepper and Graddy (1990). Alternatively,
ine¢ ciency may be related to the quality of the rms production factors.
5
managers may spend time and e¤ort in improving the location of inputs within the network,
monitoring employees, solving potential conicts, etc. Whatever these cost reducing activities
may be, we will refer to them as e¤ort. Denote by i and eit, rm is ine¢ ciency and e¤ort levels,
respectively. Note that these two variables are unobservable. We also allow the possibility of
technical progress, which is captured by a time trend t. Each rm faces a long-run cost function,
conditional on ine¢ ciency and e¤ort, of the form:
cit = C(yit; !lit ; !mit ; !kit ; t ji; eit;  ); (3)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Note that while ine¢ ciency i is exogenous,
cost reducing e¤ort eit is a choice variable for rm i, and will therefore depend on the competitive
pressures impinging on the activity of the rm.
In a second step, we need to dene the structure of the system of equations (1), (2), and
(3). This entails describing the rmspricing and e¤ort decisions. Before entering into the
analysis, it is worth reminding that the pricing structure itself is independent of the nature of
the competitive pressures impinging on the activity of the rm.7 Thus, although prices and
e¤ort are determined simultaneously, the rmsdecisions will be presented separately, for ease
of exposition.
3 Competitive Pressure and Cost Reduction
This section focuses on the construction of the structural cost function. The entry of Optimus
in 1998, as well as the 2000 liberalization, may have inuenced the cost reducing activities of
rms. We propose to account for the competitive pressures potentially unleashed by these two
events through the cost function (3) that is conditional on ine¢ ciency i and the e¤ort level ei.
Deriving the equilibrium level of e¤ort and plugging it back into the conditional cost function
allows us to derive a structural cost function that can be estimated. The aim of this approach
is twofold. First, we can test against each other di¤erent scenarios associated with these two
events in order to determine whether the entry of Optimus or the 2000 market liberalization
had a signicant impact on the cost reducing e¤ort of the Portuguese mobile telephony rms.
Second, accounting for these changes in incentives through the cost structure enables us to
reduce the source of mispecication, and avoid biases in the estimation of the technological
7The way we incorporate the technical ine¢ ciency and e¤ort parameters allows the incentive-pricing di-
chotomy principle to hold (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). This means that the same pricing formula applies whether
we assume strong or weak competitive pressures.
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parameters.8
As mentioned before, a rm can exert e¤ort eit to reduce its operating costs cit. The cost
reduction activity induces an internal cost 	(eit j), where  is a parameter to be estimated.
Taking into consideration the operating cost reduction and the internal cost of e¤ort, the rm
sets the optimal e¤ort level eit that maximizes its prot. Firm is prot is the di¤erence between
revenue Rit = pitDit and total cost cit (eit; :) + 	(eit; :):
it(pit; eit; nit 1) = pitD(pit;pjt; rt; nit 1; t)  C(yit; !lit ; !mit ; !kit ; t ji; eit ) 	(eit): (4)
Assuming an innite horizon set-up, a rms e¤ort choice problem, given the output level, is:
max
eit
1X
t=0
it(pit; eit; nit 1) s.t. nit = Nit(pit)
Denote by V (nit) the optimal value function for rm i, given the size of the its network nit.
The Bellman equation for rm is e¤ort choice problem, given the output level, is:
V (nit 1) = max
eit
fit(pit; eit; nit 1) + V (nit)g . (5)
where  is the discount factor. The rst order condition for e¤ort is:
 @C(yit;  ji; eit )
@eit
= 	0(eit); (6)
which implies that the optimal e¤ort level equalizes marginal cost reduction and the marginal
disutility of e¤ort.
We consider two periods. First, a period "B", which refers either to the phase before the
entry of Optimus, or before the 2000 liberalization. And second, a period "A", which refers
either to the phase after the entry of Optimus, or after the 2000 liberalization. We expect rms
to provide e¤ort during both periods, and the e¤ort level in the second period to be higher
than the e¤ort level in rst period, i.e., eAi > e
B
i . However, to be able to derive and identify
two di¤erent closed forms for the cost function (3), we need to normalize eBi = 0, and let e
A
i be
determined by Condition (6).9 Given these two e¤ort levels, we can write the cost function as
cs(esit; :); (7)
where s denotes the type of competitive regime, that can be either "B" or "A". Note that
Equation (7) entails two di¤erent cost structures that are conditional on the period studied.
8Previous studies have attempted to account for cost endogeneity problems after a change in regulation.
Among them, Parker and Roeller (1997) analyzes the impact of regulatory changes on the competitiveness of
mobile telecommunications markets. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) shows how rmscost reducing activity is
related to the regulatory contracts set by public authorities in the public transit industry.
9This assumption is justiable, given that what matters in our analysis is the di¤erence eAi   eBi . Note that
we do not force eAi to be positive when estimating it.
7
4 Evaluating Cost Reductions
The next step consists of proposing specic functional forms for the demand, network, and
cost functions, as well as for the cost reducing e¤ort, in order to derive the set of structural
equations to be estimated. Using data from the Portuguese mobile telephony rms, we are
capable of shedding light on the cost structure that ts reality the best, i.e., we are able of
guring out which event, the entry of Optimus or the 2000 liberalization, had a signicant
impact on the rms behavior. This section describes the data and presents the empirical
model, as well as the estimation results.
4.1 Data
In this study, we use data at the rm level. For the cost and the network equations, this is
the type of data that is usually considered. However, on the demand side, this could constitute
a potential drawback. It is useful to have disaggregated demand data at the consumers level to
estimate the own price elasticity of demand. The advantage of this is that it takes into account
consumerscharacteristics that may a¤ect rmsbehavior, and it allows describing with greater
precision consumersdecisions. However, we do not have data at the consumer level. This
obliges us to evaluate an average demand elasticity for all the rms of the sample. Note that
this is a minor concern in our study, since our main objective on the demand side is to shed
light on whether rms produce on the elastic or inelastic part of the industry demand curve.
The data we have is perfectly valid for our aim.
The dataset has been constructed for the period 1992-2003 from raw data collected by
Autoridade da Concorrência, the Portuguese national competition authority. The data consists
of quarterly observations obtained directly from the three rms under consideration in our
study, namely Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus.
The variables were constructed as follows. In the cost function, total costs (cit), production
(yit), wages (!lit), prices of materials (!mit), and price of capital (!kit) correspond to total
operating expenses, telecommunications tra¢ c in thousands minutes supplied, total labor costs
over number of employees, costs of supplies, and national interest rates on ten years treasury
bonds, respectively.
With respect to demand and network growth, rm is price (pit) for year t is measured as
total revenues over tra¢ c supplied. Moreover, the size of is network (nit) is measured by the
number of is customers, and the income per capita (rt) is measured by the Portuguese gross
national product per capita in 1995 prices.
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In all three equations, t the time trend, is equal to one in the last quarter of 1992 and
incremented by one each quarter.
4.2 Empirical Implementation
The demand function corresponding to (1), is specied in a log-linear form as follows:
ln yit = 0 + pi ln pit +
X
j 6=i
pij ln pjt + n lnnit 1 + r ln rt + tt+ u
d
it (8)
where udit is an error term. Note that this specication includes cross-price elasticities pij .
The network growth function corresponding to (2), is specied as follows:
lnnit = 0 + pi ln pit + nit 1 lnnit 1 + u
n
it (9)
where unit is an error term. Note that the lagged network size term nit 1 is included in order to
capture short-run dynamics.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas specication for the cost function presented in (3). This spec-
ication retains the main properties desirable for a cost function, while remaining tractable.
Alternative more exible specications, such as the translog function, lead to cumbersome com-
putations of the rst order conditions when e¤ort is unobservable.10 The cost function is then
specied as:
ln cit = 0 + l ln!lit + m ln!mit + k ln!kit + y ln yit + tt+ i   eit + ucit; (10)
where ucit is an error term. We impose homogeneity of degree one in input prices, i.e., l+m+
k = 1.
The reader should remember that i and eit are both unobservable. First, the ine¢ ciency i
is characterized by a density function f (i), dened over an interval [L;1[, where L denotes
the most e¢ cient rm. Second, the e¤ort eit is dened as follows. Dene the cost of e¤ort as:11
	it(eit) = exp(eit)  1;  > 0. (11)
Then, using the functional forms of operating costs (10), the cost of e¤ort (11), and the rst
order condition for e¤ort (6), we can express the e¤ort level for period "A". The rst-order
condition that determines the e¤ort level eA can now be written as:
cit =  exp(eit). (12)
10In particular, in order to solve for Equation (6), plug it into Equation (3), and estimate Equation (7)
applying parametric techniques, we need a Cobb-Douglas specication.
11The function 	() is a convex, with 	(0) = 0, 	0(eit) > 0 and 	00(eit) > 0.
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Substituting (10) in (12), we can solve for eAit as:
eAit =
1
+ 1
 
0 + y ln yit + l ln!lit + m ln!mit + k ln!kit + tt+ i   ln+ ucit

; (13)
while eBit = 0.
As suggested by the new theory of regulation, the e¤ort level of a rm increases with i,
i.e., a more ine¢ cient rm optimally exerts more e¤ort than a less ine¢ cient rm, @
2C
@it@eit
< 0.
Moreover, rms are willing to provide less e¤ort when e¤ort is more costly, i.e., when the cost
reducing technology parameter  is larger. Substituting back eAit and e
B
it into (10) allows us to
obtain the nal forms to be estimated cA () and cB (). We therefore obtain:
ln cAit = c0 + 
0
l ln!lit + 
0
m ln!mit + 
0
k ln!kit + 
0
y ln yit + 
0
tt+ i + u
c0
it; (14)
and
ln cBit = 0 + l ln!lit + m ln!mit + k ln!kit + y ln yit + tt+ i + u
c
it; (15)
where  = 
1+
, c0 = 0 +
1
1+
(ln  0), 0 = , and uc0it = ucit. Note that lim !+10s = s,
i.e., as the cost of e¤ort grows, the e¤ort level falls, and expression (14) converges to (15). This
implies that if e¤ort is not taken into account, the estimates of the elasticities are biased.
The cost function to be estimated is then:
ln cit = 
A
it

c0 + 
0
l ln!lit + 
0
m ln!mit + 
0
k ln!kit + 
0
y ln yit + 
0
tt+ i + u
c0
it

+
Bit

0 + l ln!lit + m ln!mit + k ln!kit + y ln yit + tt+ i + u
c
it

; (16)
where Ait takes value 1 during period "A", and 0 otherwise, while 
B
it takes value 1 during
period "B", and 0 otherwise. In the course of the estimation, several vectors Ait and 
B
it will
be assumed, depending on which scenario is considered, and their results will be tested against
each other, to unravel their e¤ects on competition.
The system of equations formed by (8), (9) and (16) is determined simultaneously. Ac-
cordingly, and in order to avoid endogeneity problems, these equations are estimated by the
Instrumental Variables Estimation Method. In particular, we use the prediction n^it from the
network function (9) to express nit in the demand function (8). Likewise, we use a prediction
y^it from the demand function (8) to express yit in the cost function (16). Moreover, to account
for the endogeneity of pit in the demand and network equations (8) and (9), we use pit 1 as an
instrument for pit. The cost function (16) includes a non-observable parameter, i, character-
ized by a Half-Normal density function f (). When estimating this cost-function, one needs
to compute the integral of the joint density function of i and ucit over [0;1[:12 Note that the
12For more details, the reader should refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
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system is identied and all parameters can be recovered, given the homogeneity of degree 1 in
input prices.
4.3 Estimation Results
Tables 1 to 3 in Appendix 2 provide the results for the econometric model. We emphasize in
this section the two main arguments discussed in this paper. First, depending on how incentives
and cost reduction activities are interpreted, di¤erent cost structures can be estimated. Then,
a non-nested test helps us to choose the best cost structure in the sense that it is the one that
ts the data the best. Once this is done, a precise evaluation of the nature of competition in
the industry can be obtained in a second step. This latter procedure also requires important
ingredients on the demand and network growth sides which are discussed below.
4.3.1 Demand and Network
The results for demand are presented in Table 1, where di¤erent types of estimation proce-
dures are considered. In all cases the goodness of t measured by the R
2
is close to 1. Model
1 is a simple OLS procedure. To account for the presence of autocorrelation,13 we estimated
Models 2 and 3 using the Cochrane-Orcutt method for a fourth-order autoregressive model.
Note that Model 3 adds to Model 2 rmsxed e¤ects and a time trend. A Wald Test whose
statistic is F = 9:11, suggests that rmsxed e¤ects and the trend are jointly signicant, and
thus favors Model 3. Finally, in order to account for short run dynamics, we estimated Model
4, which adds to Model 3 lagged output, yit 1, as an explanatory variable.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the network growth equation obtained by the Cochrane-
Orcutt method for a fourth-order autoregressive model.14
Taken together, the demand and network equations allow us to evaluate short-run and long-
run price as well as income elasticities, using a procedure described in Appendix 1. The demand
and network functions exhibit a pattern of short-run dynamics. In Table 1, the estimate of the
lagged output, y 1, is signicant at a 1% level and positive, which implies that a shock to one
of the demand function variables will fully translate into demand only over time. Similarly, in
13Several tests were performed in order to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The
Whites statisitc is 23.039, which discards the presence of heteroscedasticity. On the other hand, the Lagrange
statistic is 80.492, indicating that the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation is rejected.
14An initial simple OLS estimation showed evidence of autocorrelation with a Lagrange multiplier statistic
equal to 49.596. The Whites statistic, equal to 5.395, failed to reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are
homoescedastic.
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Table 2, the estimate for the coe¢ cient of the lagged network size, nt 1, is signicant at a 1%
level.
The results obtained for Model 4 of Table 1, and those of Table 2, suggest the following
three observations:
Observation 1: The industry is characterized by signicant network economies. 
From Model 4 of Table 1, the short-run demand network elasticity is n = 0:35, and the
long-run demand network elasticity is yn =
n
1 y 1 = 0:48. This implies that a 1% increase
in the size of the network causes demand to increase by 0:351% (0:48% resp.) in the following
quarter (in the long-run resp.). This result is in line with both economic theory and empirical
studies (see Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2003), Madden et al. (2004), and Pereira and Pernias
(2004)). With respect to the network function, it can be seen from Table 2 that the short-
run network price elasticity is p 1 =  0:139, while the long-run network price elasticity is
np =
p 1
1 n 1
=  1:112. This implies that a 1% increase in the price causes the size of the
network to decrease by 0:13% in the same quarter, and to decrease by 1:11% in the long-run.
This set of results has two main implications. First, it suggests that the size of the network
responds to price variations. Second, it shows that there is considerable inertia in the way the
size of the network responds to price. This can be taken as indirect evidence of the presence of
consumer switching costs in the industry.
Observation 2: The market demand is inelastic with respect to price if indirect e¤ects on the
size of the network are not accounted for. 
Model 4 of Table 1 shows that the estimate of the direct short-run price elasticity is dsr =
 0:384, while the estimate of the direct long-run price elasticity is dlr =  0:53.15 This suggests
that a 1% increase in price causes demand to decrease by 0:384% in the same quarter, and to
decrease by 0:53% in the long-run. These estimates are small but highly signicant. Besides,
they are in line with the results reported in previous studies of the mobile telephony industry.16
Note that, however, the total long-run price elasticity is tlr =  1:11. This interesting result
shows that accounting for the long-run impact of a price change is important to evaluate the
15These are average values across rms. We also estimated elasticities for each rm, which are:  0:107 for
Vodafone,  0:404 for Tmn, and  0:797 for Optimus. The elasticity of Vodafone is not signicant.
16See Hausman (1997), Madden et al. (2004), and OFTEL (2002).
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overall impact of price on demand.
The only cross-price demand elasticity that is statistically signicant is the one that describes
the interaction between Vodafone and Optimus. It suggests that the products of these two rms
may be substitutes. The estimates of the cross-price elasticities of Tmn and Vodafone, and of
Tmn and Optimus; are small and not signicant. However, they seem to indicate that the
products of Vodafone and Optimus may be complements of the product of Tmn.
Observation 3: Mobile telephony is a luxury good and demand increases over time. 
Demand increases with the gross national product per capita. This result is in line with
other studies such as Gruber and Verboven (2001). Note that the income elasticity of demand
is r = 1:94, suggesting that mobile telephony is a luxury good.
Finally, demand increases over time. The coe¢ cient of the time trend although small is
signicant and positive. This highlights again the importance of accounting for dynamics in
the industry. Note that the time trend captures the growth in demand that occurs for reasons
unrelated to short-run dynamics or network economies, which also exert their impact on demand
over time.
4.3.2 Costs
Table 3 presents the estimates for the cost function. This equation is estimated under
alternative scenarios related to the entry of Optimus in 1998 and the 2000 liberalization. In all
cases but Model 1, we include the term i to measure ine¢ ciency. Additionally, the following
distinctions are made: (i) Scenario 1, with no e¤ort and no ine¢ ciency term, (ii) Scenario 2,
where rms do not make any additional e¤ort to reduce ine¢ ciency after the entry of Optimus
and the 2000 liberalization, i.e., the e¤ect of either of these two shocks to the industry is not
accounted for, (iii) Scenario 3, where only the entry of Optimus in 1998 a¤ects rmscost
reducing behavior, and (iv) Scenario 4, where only the 2000 liberalization a¤ects the rms
cost reducing behavior. Additionally, we considered Scenario 1, which is similar to Scenario 1
without a time trend. The latter model will be useful to discuss returns to scale.
Note that the variables are signicant and have the expected sign.17 In particular, costs
increase with input prices and production. Moreover, we propose the following two observations:
17The value of the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier statistic is 3.14. Thus, the test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. The value of Whites heteroscedasticity test is 18.033. Hence, the
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are homoescedastic.
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Observation 4: The entry of Optimus caused rms to increase their e¤ort level and reduce
costs. 
The alternative scenarios are tested against each other, applying the non-nested hypothesis
test proposed in Vuong (1989).18 The test shows that Scenario 4 is rejected against Scenario 3.
This suggests that the 2000 liberalization had limited e¤ect on the rmscost reduction e¤ort,
compared to the entry of Optimus in 1998. Scenarios 1 and 2 are rejected against Scenario 3,
which includes an ine¢ ciency measure, and assumes that rms exert cost reducing e¤ort after
the entry of Optimus in 1998. Given that Scenario 1 represents the standard approach proposed
by the literature on oligopolistic competition, its rejection advocates the construction of models
including these components, and indicates that one has to be cautious when interpreting the
results derived from other models. Moreover, the rejection of Scenario 2 shows the importance
of accounting for the e¤ects of cost reducing e¤ort on rmstechnology and ine¢ ciency.
There are alternative explanations that could possibly justify the increase in cost reduction
after the entry of Optimus. A rst possibility is preemptive behavior by the incumbents,
which could have taken the form of capital or capacity expansion with delayed e¤ects on costs.
Preemption in the sense of market foreclosure should be discarded because the decision to allow
the entry of additional rms was taken at the EU level. Preemption in the sense of preparation
for future competition was tested. We estimated alternative scenarios where cost reduction
occurred before the entry of Optimus, namely in 1997 and 1996. Both scenarios were rejected
by our non-nested test. Another possible explanation for the cost reduction after the entry
of Optimus could be spillover e¤ects. Optimus could have been a lower cost rm from whom
the incumbents learned. However, the estimation of the ine¢ ciency scores i for each rm
suggest that Optimus is the most ine¢ cient rm. In addition, a lower cost rm would have
optimally charged lower prices. But over our period of observation, Optimus did not o¤er the
lowest prices.19 Taken together, these two remarks suggest that there is no clear evidence that
Optimus enjoyed any technological advantage that beneted the two incumbents.
Observation 5: The industry is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
From Scenarios 1 to 4, it appears that the production parameter y ranges form 1.004 to
18Values for the Vuong test below 2 favor the alternative model against Model 4, and values above 2 favor
Model 4 against the alternative model.
19These values are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request.
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1.029. These parameters are not statistically di¤erent from 1, indicating that the industry
is characterized by constant returns to scale. This result is consistent with the few previous
studies on mobile telecommunications: McKenzie and Small (1997) shed light on constant
or slightly decreasing returns to scale, while Foreman and Beauvais (1999) nd mild scale
economies. We expect costs to increase proportionally to output, since the mobile telephony
is less lumpy, or more modular, than the xed telephony technology which is characterized by
increasing returns to scale. Mobile telephony rms can meet demand increases by splitting the
cells where their capacity is binding.20 Note that Scenario 1contains a production parameter
y that is signicantly lower than 1. This clearly shows the importance of accounting for
technological progress at the moment of identifying returns to scale. The equipment required
to meet the increasing levels of demand is acquired at di¤erent points in time, representing
di¤erent technology vintages. Technological progress during our period of observation was very
robust. This makes it hard to disentangle whatever scale economies that might exist from
technological progress if a time trend is not accounted for in the course of the estimation.
[Figure 2]
Taken together, the two periods before and after the entry ofOptimus allow us to identify the
cost reducing activity since we considered di¤erent cost structure for each period.21 Accordingly,
one can compute a direct measure of the e¤ect of entry of Optimus. From Equation (13), a
cost reduction ratio is given by ' = c
A(:) CB(:)
CB(:)
= exp ( e)  1. The cost reduction ratio for the
average rm for the period after the entry of Optimus is ' =  0:266. This implies that, on
average, the entry of Optimus in 1997 led to a 26:6% cost decrease at the industry level. Figure
2 illustrates the evolution of the average costs of Tmn and Vodafone.
20A cell is an hexagonal geographic region. See Hausman (2002) for a description of the mobile telephone
technology. A cell has a limited number of channels. However, this limit can be overcome. Cells can be split
into smaller cells in order to increase capacity. This implies an increase in underlying infrastructure, such as
the number of base transceiver stations, antennas, supporting towers, backhaul links, base station controllers,
and possibly an upgrade of the mobile switching centers.
21We could measure the cost reduction after the entry of Optimus estimating two costs functions, one pre- and
one post-entry, and comparing the predicted costs. Our methodology, however, improves upon this alternative
approach for two reasons. First, we estimate the coe¢ cients describing the underlying technology with a larger
sample. Note that, for instance, in order to estimate y, the alternative methodology would use information
only for the period 1992-1997, while with our methodology, we use information from the period 1992-2003, at
the cost of adding one more parameter. And second, in the next section we need to estimate marginal costs to
evaluate competition. A biased measure of marginal costs would lead to wrong conclusions about the evolution
of price-cost margins after the entry of Optimus.
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In a second step, one can obtain a precise evaluation of the nature of competition in the
industry after the entry of Optimus. We turn in the following section to the competitive aspect
of our study.
5 Evaluating Competition
We focus now on the competitive aspect of our study. Before turning to the evaluation
of rmsprice-marginal cost margins, note that the analysis of the time series of the average
prices of Tmn and Vodafone, presented in Figure 2, shows that the average prices of Tmn and
Vodafone are co-integrated, and have a downward break in 1997. This suggests that the entry
of Optimus in 1998 caused the rivals to reduce prices.22 Note that these price reductions are in
line with our previous results that rms reduced costs following the entry of Optimus.
[Figure 3]
Having now the most adequate cost estimates in hand, we are capable of characterizing
the degree of competition in the industry from the evaluation of rms price-marginal cost
discrepancies.23 We will also compare our results with those obtained if cost endogeneity is not
accounted for.
In an innite horizon set-up, a rms price choice problem, given the e¤ort level, is:
max
pit
1X
t=0
it(pit; eit; nit 1) s.t. nit = N(pit); (17)
where the prot it(:) is dened in (4). The Bellman equation for rm is pricing problem,
given the e¤ort level, is:
V (nit 1) = max
pit
fit(pit; eit; nit 1) + V (nit)g :
The associated rst-order condition for rm i is:
yit + pit
@yit
@pit
 MCit@yit
@pit
+ 

pit+1
@yit+1
@nit
@nit
@pit
 MCit+1@yit+1
@nit
@nit
@pit

= 0; (18)
22Note that economic theory is not always conclusive regarding the relation between the number of competitors
in a specic industry and rmsprices. Garcia et al. (2005), Rosenthal (1980), and Seade (1980) develop models
where prices increase with the number of rms in the market.
23By estimating cost and demand functions, we are able to generate direct measures of the price-cost margins.
This approach follows the spirit of Genesove and Mullins (1998) paper that shows that direct estimations of the
conduct parameter through the pricing rule may lead to signicant underestimation of market power. Similarly,
imposing a specic conduct and estimating costs may lead to over or underestimation of costs when perfect
competition or monopoly are assumed respectively. On the contrary, estimates are quite insensitive to the
assumed demand functional form.
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suggesting that a rms optimal price at t should account for two e¤ects. The rst one is the
direct impact of the current price on the current demand, @yit
@pit
. The second one is the impact
of the current price on the current size of the rms network, and thereby on the next period
rms demand, @nit
@pit
@yit+1
@nit
. Equation (18) can be rewritten as:
Mit =
pit  MCit
pit
=   1
dlr + yiiynnp
, (19)
where MCit denotes marginal cost, dlr is the direct long-run price elasticity, yn is the long-
run demand network elasticity, and np is the long-run network price elasticity. Additionally,
we denote the demand growth for rm i by yi =
yit+1
yit
, and the margin growth for rm i by
i =
Mit+1
Mit
.24
Hence, using our estimates of the cost, network, and demand equations, we evaluate in a
rst step the price-cost margins expressed in the left-hand side of Equation (19) under the
various scenarios under consideration. Thus, we determine whether di¤erent conclusions can
be reached regarding rmscompetitive behavior, depending on which scenario is accounted
for. In a second step, we test these margins against those obtained if rms followed a Nash
behavior, as expressed in the right-hand side of Equation (19).
From the expressions of costs (16), demand (8), and network growth (9), the rst-order
condition (19) can be rewritten as:
Mit =
pit  MCit
pit
=
(
pi
1  y 1

+ yi

n
1  y 1
 
p 1
1  n 1
!) 1
. (20)
Through the estimation of the cost function, marginal costs MCit can be easily recovered.
Putting them together with the observed values of prices, we are able to evaluate the price-
marginal cost marginMit set by each rm, dened as the left-hand side of Equation (20). Table
4 presents the values obtained under Scenario 1 and Scenario 3.
One rst interesting result is worth emphasizing. The traditional approach with no inef-
ciency and no e¤ort, namely Scenario 1, underestimates the average marginal costs MCit,
and overestimates the average margin Mit of the industry. Hence, the traditional approach
underestimates the competition faced by the Portuguese mobile rms. The margins obtained
under Scenarios 1 and 3 are signicantly di¤erent at the 10% level as shown by a t-test (H0 :
M3it  M1it = 0), whose statistic is equal to 1:718.
In a second step, we simulate the Nash margin MNit , as dened by the right-hand side of
Equation (20). Our aim is to test whether rms follow a Nash behavior, i.e., we test whether
24We are implicitly assuming a perfect information setting, otherwise we would have to incorporate the rms
expectations about the future values of the relevant variables.
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the Nash margins MNit are close to the real margins Mit. Note that values of the elasticities
dlr, yn, and np are obtained from the estimation of the network and demand equations while
we need to simulate values for , yi, and i, since these latter parameters are unobservable.
If rms have a myopic behavior, i.e., if  = 0, Equation (20) becomesMit =   1dlr . The latter
corresponds to the standard static Nash behavior index, whose value is 1:887. This theoretical
value is unrealistic, and suggests that the behavior of rms producing on the inelastic part of
the demand curve is not compatible with a static approach. This therefore calls for the dynamic
approach that we advocate in this section.
In the case where rms care about the future, i.e., if  6= 0, we adopt the following approach.
We test the hypothesis that estimated marginsMit are equal to the dynamic Nash marginsMNit
expressed in Equation (20). To do so, we setMit =MNit = 0:088, and solve for the corresponding
values of , yi, and i. Table 5 presents these values. Note for instance that, if rms expect
their margins to grow by 33%, ( = 1:33), and demand to grow by 58% (y = 1:49), they
should have a discount factor  equal to 0:9, i.e., a discount rate  = 1

 1 = 0:11. These gures
make sense only if rms have a high discount factor , i.e., a discount rate  close to zero,
and expect a large industry growth. Thus, in order to reconcile rmsactual margins and the
dynamic Nash margins, one has to assume that rms: (i) are patient, and (ii) have optimistic
beliefs about the industry growth. These two latter assumptions seem to be relevant in the
case of the Portuguese mobile telephony industry, as illustrated by the following observations:
First, note that this is an industry where it took rms from 3 to 6 years to reach protability
and where network e¤ects and switching costs play an important role. Our data set refers to a
period where the industry had not yet reached the maturity phase. During this period, rms
were conceivably more concerned with building their customer base than extracting abnormal
prots. Second, we could compare the discount rate  to any relevant discount rate that is
currently practiced. Note for instance that the average interest rate of Portuguese ten years
treasury bonds is 6.8% over the period we study. Likewise, OFTEL (2002) presents estimates
of the weighted average cost of capital for the UK mobile rms in the range of 13% to 17%.
These values are in line with our results and seem to validate our test.
6 Conclusions
The results obtained in this paper have proved fruitful on both the methodological and the
institutional side. First, we showed that a cost-network growth-demand structure that accounts
for the rmstechnical ine¢ ciency and cost reducing activities ts the data better than the
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usual model of the oligopolistic competition literature. Our application of this methodology to
the Portuguese mobile telephony industry shows that the estimates obtained from a standard
oligopoly model are potentially biased and can lead to wrong conclusions about cost reduction
and competition in the industry.
Second, it is suggested that the entry of a third rm in 1998 introduced a signicant change
in the behavior of rms regarding costs reduction. We show that the full liberalization of the
telecommunications sector in 2000 had very limited e¤ects. We also showed that the standard
oligopoly model underestimates the toughness of competition. This result is consistent with
previous contributions that account for cost endogeneity.
The results of this paper illustrate nicely the two channels through which competition can
increase welfare. Competition may lead to a reduction of both prices and costs. Such reductions
occurred in the Portuguese mobile industry, while rms were producing on the inelastic part
of the demand function. This suguests that rms were more concerned with increasing their
customer base than with receiving high prots, as has been tested and validated in this article.
Whether such concerns will vanish in the near future remains to be seen.
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Appendix 1: Short-run and long-run price elasticity
Using a lagged output variable yit 1, Equation (8) can be rewritten as follows:
ln yit = 0 + pi ln pit +
X
j 6=i
pij ln pjt + n lnnit 1 + r ln rt + tt+ y 1 ln yit 1 + u
d
it:
Or,
ln yit =
1
1  y 1L
"
0 + pi ln pit +
X
j 6=i
pij ln pjt + n lnnit 1 + r ln rt + tt+ u
d
it
#
; (21)
where L is a lag operator. Similarly, equation (9) can be rewritten as:
lnnit =
1
1  nit 1L
h
0 + pi ln pit + u
n
it
i
: (22)
Replacing Equation (22) in (21) yields:
ln yit =
1
1  y 1L

0 +
0
1  nit 1L
+

pi +
npiL
1  nit 1L

ln pit+
+
X
j 6=i
pij ln pjt + n lnnit + r ln rt + tt+ u
d
it +
unit
1  nit 1L
#
,
which suggests that an increase in is price can be decomposed into two e¤ects. First, we
dene a direct e¤ect which states that the consumers that choose to stay with rm i (they may
have large switching costs) demand less of is product:
@yit
@pit
=
pi
1  y 1
: (23)
Second, we dene an indirect e¤ect which states that some consumers choose to leave rm i for
a di¤erent rm, reducing thus the size of is network:
@yit
@nit 1
@nit 1
@pit 1
=
npi 
1  y 1
  
1  nit 1
 : (24)
Hence, we refer to the direct short-run price elasticity as the immediate partial impact of a
change in pit on the demand of rm i measured by:
dsr := pi : (25)
As such partial impact fully translates into the demand of rm i only over time, we construct
in a second step the direct long-run price elasticity measured by:
dlr :=
pi
1  y 1
: (26)
Finally, we dene the total long-run price elasticity which accounts for both direct and
indirect e¤ects, and is dened as the sum of the two elasticities in (24) and (25). It is therefore
equal to:
tlr :=
1
1  y 1

pi +
npi
1  nit 1

: (27)
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Appendix 2: Estimation Results 
 
 
Table 1: Demand Function 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
0α  1.334(a) 
(0.530) 
0.822 
(0.107) 
0.963 
(0.118) 
0.679 
(0.139) 
mp
α  -0.402 
(0.084) 
-0.541 
(0.094) 
-0.373 
(0.091) 
-0.384 
(0.086) 
12p
α  -0.016(c) 
(0.066) 
-0.262 
(0.083) 
-0.068(c) 
(0.100) 
-0.053(c) 
(0.094) 
13p
α  0.353 
(0.073) 
-0.059(c) 
(0.089) 
-0.007(c) 
(0.123) 
0.012(c) 
(0.109) 
23p
α  0.599 
(0.065) 
0.257 
(0.089) 
0.234(b) 
(0.121) 
0.210(b) 
(0.113) 
nα  1.041 
(0.042) 
0.598 
(0.078) 
0.415 
(0.076) 
0.351 
(0.074) 
rα  5.028 
(0.920) 
3.718 
(0.822) 
2.783 
(0.779) 
1.940(a) 
(0.773) 
1−y
α     0.277 
(0.081) 
tα  - - 0.007 
(0.001) 
0.004(a) 
(0.001) 
VOα  - - 0.065(c) 
(0.045) 
0.042(c) 
(0.042) 
TMα  - - 0.096(a) 
(0.041) 
0.054(c) 
(0.040) 
Error Standard 
Dev. 
0.267 
(0.018) 
0.078 
(0.006) 
0.068 
(0.005) 
0.064 
(0.005) 
Adjusted R2 0.971 0.853 0.886 0.897 
T 112 92 92 92 
Note Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
In all models, all parameters (but (a): Significant at the 5% level, (b): 
Significant at the 10% level, and (c) not significant) are significant at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Network growth 
 
Variable Parameter 
0γ  0.242 
(0.063) 
tp
γ  -0.139 
(0.043) 
1−n
γ  0.875 
(0.103) 
Error Standard Dev. 0.050 
(0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.911 
T 88 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
All parameters are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Cost Equation 
 
 Scenarios 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1’) 
0β  -2.640 
(0.468) 
-2.825 
(0.417) 
-3.329 
(0.422) 
-2.718 
(0.437) 
1.364 
(0.360) 
lβ  0.736 
(0.046) 
0.736 
(0.045) 
0.759 
(0.042) 
0.723 
(0.048) 
0.514 
(0.057) 
mβ  0.176 
(0.031) 
0.141 
(0.038) 
0.177 
(0.034) 
0.139 
(0.038) 
0.062(c) 
(0.041) 
yβ  1.004 
(0.035) 
1.028 
(0.038) 
1.029 
(0.034) 
1.022 
(0.039) 
0.786 
(0.039) 
tβ  -0.047 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.005) 
-0.033 
(0.005) 
-0.042 
(0.006) 
- 
µ  - - 2.856 
(0.219) 
4.738 
(0.964) 
- 
θ  Standard Dev. - 0.366 
(0.047) 
0.234(b) 
(0.142) 
0.361 
(0.050) 
- 
Error Standard Dev. 0.251 
(0.017) 
0.123 
(0.029) 
0.159(a) 
(0.070) 
0.126 
(0.032) 
0.349 
(0.023) 
Adjusted R2 0.971    0.943 
Vuong Test. 
(3) against alternative models 
3.401 2.708 - 2.679  
T 112 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Values for the Vuong test below –2 favor the alternative model against model (3), and above 2 
favor model (3) against the alternative model. 
In all models, all parameters (but (a): Significant at the 5% level, (b): Significant at the 10% 
level, and (c) not significant) are significant at the 1% level. 
Models: (1) Model with no inefficiency and no effort. 
 (2) Model with inefficiency but no effort. 
(3) Model with inefficiency and effort. Firms exert effort after the entry of Optimus. 
(4) Model with inefficiency and effort. Firms exert effort from full liberalization in 2000. 
 (1’) Same as (1), with no trend. 
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Table 4: Estimated Margins 
 
 itP  itMC  itM  
Scenario (1) 0.514 0.334 0.128 
Scenario (3) 0.514 0.350 0.088 
 
 
Table 5: Industry Growth levels and impatience 
 
µ∆  y∆  δ  
 1786,12 0,10
 223,27 0,80
0,01 210,13 0,85
 198,46 0,90
 188,01 0,95
 17,86 0,10
 2,23 0,80
1 2,10 0,85
 1,98 0,90
 1,88 0,95
 13,43 0,10
 1,68 0,80
1,33 1,58 0,85
 1,49 0,90
 1,41 0,95
 10,76 0,10
 1,34 0,80
1,66 1,27 0,85
 1,20 0,90
 1,13 0,95
 8,93 0,10
 1,12 0,80
2 1,05 0,85
 0,99 0,90
 0,94 0,95
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Appendix 3: Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Revenue Market Shares 
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Figure 2: Average Costs 
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Figure 3: Average Prices 
 
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
1,1
19
94
19
94
19
95
19
95
19
96
19
96
19
97
19
97
19
98
19
98
19
99
19
99
20
00
20
00
20
01
20
01
20
02
20
02
20
03
20
03
time
€/
m
in
firm A firm B
 
